









clc 96000425 X Collection
(cont.)

INDEX

Page: 1

Barcode Number	Box Number	Total of Volumes	Call Number
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS  0 021 174 677 4	798A	103	JV221.A6 (1949) no. 1-103
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS  0 021 174 678 6	798B	53	JV221.A6 (1949) no. 104-156
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS  0 021 174 679 8	799	97	JV221.A6 (1949) no. 1-97
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS  0 021 174 680 4	800	42	JV2011 (1905-1961) no. 1-42
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS  0 021 174 681 6	801	55	JV2011 (1888-1950) no. 1-55
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS  0 021 174 682 8	802	20	JV4202.A1 - JV8749.I8
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS  0 021 174 683 A	803	70	JX27.C6 - JX4265
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS  0 021 174 684 1	804	27	JX1908.G3D4 - JX1908.V6F6

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFICATION FILE NO.

15
Strictly Confidential

No. E - B 19

3 11 15 49
**STUDIES OF
AMERICAN INTERESTS IN
THE WAR AND THE PEACE**

Economic and Financial Series

Alvin H. Hansen

Jacob Viner

Joint-Rapporteurs

Subject:

THE WAR AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

Needs of Future United States Foreign Policy

Preliminary Memorandum, First Draft

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

X-JX27

.C6

#1

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 215
Strictly Confidential

No. E - B 19
SUPPLEMENT I

3 11
15
49

STUDIES OF AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE WAR AND THE PEACE

Economic and Financial Series

Alvin H. Hansen Jacob Viner
Joint-Rapporteurs

Subject:

THE WAR AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

A Comparison of the Trade Position of a German - Dominated
Europe and a Western Hemisphere - British Empire - or
East Trade Bloc

Preliminary Memorandum, First Draft

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

X-JX27

C6

#2

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFICATION FILE NO. 315

Strictly Confidential



X-JX 27.

.C 6

#3

No P - B 70

23

STUDIES OF
AMERICAN INTERESTS IN
THE WAR AND THE PEACE

Political Series

Carter Goodrich Henry M. Wriston
Joint-Rapporteurs

Memorandum on:

DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES AND IMMUNITIES FOR
OFFICIALS OF INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

July 31, 1943

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

#4

X-JX 27

.115

U.S. & W.S. GENERAL	B-1151
NO	

REPORT ON PROBLEM V - RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

Brown University Cooperating Group
Providence, Rhode Island

OCT 4 1

United States Division
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

RECEIVED

DEC 7 1943

8/2/43

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

- Whether urgently needed relief should be sent to the people of occupied countries while the war is still in progress or not seems to be a question which turns upon the facts in the case. The decision should not be difficult once they are known. If such relief will get to the needy people rather than to the Nazis, if its presence does not enable the Nazis to reduce further their own supplies to the occupied countries, and if the goods needed can be sent without serious impairment to our own war effort, then by all means we should give such relief as quickly and as adequately as possible. By doing so, not only shall we serve the humanitarian purpose of saving lives, but also, we shall advance our political and ideological warfare and may increase the number of those among the inhabitants of the occupied countries who, upon our invasion, will be willing and able to help us. If some but not all of the conditions mentioned are realized, our choice should be based upon consideration of the relative values involved. Our present plans seem to rest upon comparatively rapid conquest through invasion, rather than upon starving Germany out through a war of attrition. Therefore, some leakage of food supplies into Nazi hands should not constitute a serious objection to the relief program.

After the war the principle that relief should be based exclusively on demonstrated needs should be followed except in those cases where there are not enough supplies to go around. In such circumstances it seems reasonable, and in any case will be insisted upon, that we send the necessary supplies first to friends and only second to former enemies. Such inequalities in relief, however, should be allowed only up to the subsistence level. That is, having raised the French, for example, to the subsistence level, we should not then further improve their living standard at the cost of withholding subsistence relief from the Axis countries.

- There seems to be no sharp line between relief and rehabilitation. Soup kitchens are clearly cases of immediate relief, and rebuilding of factories clearly cases of rehabilitation, but providing seeds for the next harvest and tractors to work the fields appear to be border-line cases. It seems clear that immediate relief must be rushed without waiting for a long-term plan. On the other hand, the advantages of planning for purposes of rehabilitation are so obvious that as relief turns into rehabilitation it should follow increasingly a planned pattern. Such planning should be organized by a United Nations commission or by a commission of the international organization which we hope will be established. Such a commission should work as closely as possible with representatives of the countries to which help will be given.
- We should insist that as much as possible relief and rehabilitation be administered without political conditions. The economic recovery of Europe, including Germany, is so important for the future peace of the world--for example, to prevent such economic desperation as drove Germany into the arms of Hitler in the thirties--that we must work steadfastly to promote it regardless of whether the governments of the countries receiving aid fit our tastes exactly or not. Admittedly, this principle will be difficult to follow in practice. For example, there would doubtless be much opposition in this country to providing economic aid for a Communist Germany, let alone a modified Fascist one. We should do our best to overcome such opposition. Russia as well as Great Britain and the United States will have an important influence upon the reorganization of governments in

NORTH EASTERN UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITIES COMMITTEE ON POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS
RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS
RELIEF AND REHABILITATION
August 27, 1943

FS & ES GENERAL

NO. B-1161

#5 X-JX27
115

At the meeting of the Northwestern Committee on August 2, 1943, Professor Ernest R. Hovner offered twelve recommendations and comments on the Problem of Relief and Rehabilitation. Professors Thomas D. Eliot and Arthur E. Case offered amendments. At the meeting on August 26, the recommendations and comments with some of the amendments were adopted.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to insure the stability of the peace, it is essential that the United Nations enter into a program of relief and rehabilitation of occupied countries as soon as these are freed from the control of the Axis. This program should have as its chief elements:

- (1) Administration through an agency representing the United Nations (including the governments in exile).
- (2) This agency should have the sole responsibility for the administration of relief and rehabilitation programs.
- (3) Private agencies, insofar as they wish to participate in the program, may do so by contributing money, goods, and services as a part of the program, working in co-operation with and under the supervision of this centralized agency.
- (4) Contributions in money and goods upon the part of each nation shall be in accordance with some standardized formula by which available surplus may be determined, these surpluses to represent each nation's contribution.
- (5) Assistance shall be given within the limits of available resources solely in accordance with the needs of peoples rendered destitute by war.
- (6) Emergency relief shall be given destitute people of the Axis countries immediately upon occupation, at first through military channels. As soon as possible, such relief shall be channeled through local governments and native agencies willing to co-operate in the recovery of the area under a non-fascist regime acceptable to the United Nations' central authority. Relief shall be financed separately from rehabilitation, but the former shall be so administered as to expedite the latter, and rehabilitation measures shall be introduced first where productive employment is most needed to remove the need for emergency relief. Rehabilitation should be considered not with regard to single countries or groups of countries, but with regard to the economic and social reorganization of the world. Special care should be taken to see that, in the early period following the cessation of hostilities, pre-war social and economic agencies are not re-established which would make more difficult the creation of a reasoned world order. Military authorities should be prevented from making commitments which would hamper such reorganization.
- (7) Relief expenditures shall not be charged against the governments of people receiving United Nations relief. Rehabilitation expenditures may be charged to Axis governments and conquered peoples, but payments shall not be required from any

August 15, 1943

PRINCETON GROUP FOR POST WAR PROBLEMS

REPORT ON V.

(Comments by Mr. Alexander Loveday on certain questions posed by the Central Committee's pamphlet dealing with "Relief and Rehabilitation.")

Question III: Shall the relief effort be planned mainly to tide over an immediate emergency, or as a first step in a thorough-going reconstruction program?

Answer: The main purpose is to get the machinery of production into working order as soon as possible. For this purpose a plan, as elastic as possible, should be prepared for each country. On the other hand, any vast over-all plan for the reorganization of all of Europe is out of the question and should not be contemplated.

Remarks: The importance of relief can be more readily understood after an examination of the experience of the two years following 1918.

Imported goods to the value of	\$17.5 billion
Exported " " " " "	5
Leaving deficit of	12.5
Which was covered by invisible exports (freight, emigrants, etc.) to a value of	6
Leaving deficit of	6.5
Covered by long term capital	4
Short term borrowings and sale of currency	\$ 2.5

Relief operations accounted for less than 1 billion. Most countries in Eastern and Central Europe were unable to obtain any sort of credit in anything like adequate amounts with the results (a) that they could not obtain the raw materials, etc. that were required for the revival of business and reemployment of men, (b) that they were forced to sell their currency for what it would fetch to acquire some part of the materials of which they were in urgent need. Owing to the first of these effects the costs of unemployment remained high and the volume of production and taxable income low, so that governments were forced to resort to the printing press and inflate their currencies; owing to the second, the pressure on the exchange accentuated this inflation and hyper-inflation ensued. So owing to the lack of any concerted action at the outset to reconstruct business, country after country was overwhelmed by inflation and reconstruction took the form of trying to heal one festering sore after another.

Owing to the inflation all persons having their savings in banks, bonds, etc. were ruined and in certain countries what had been the stablest element in society was converted into a revolutionary class. The failure to reconstruct in the first two years after the Armistice contributed largely to the outbreak of war in 1939. Hence the significance of proper measures of relief and reconstruction at the close of the present conflict.

It was only in 1925 that grain production in Europe reached the 1913 level, although dairy and meat production attained pre-war levels at an earlier date. After the present war the situation will probably be worse. Although cereals can be grown comparatively quickly there is little room for optimism in view of Europe's experience after 1919. Meat production will be much more difficult, since it is estimated that Europe's present cattle herds are about 15 per

X-JX 27

.115

#7

BROWN UNIVERSITY
REPORT ON PROBLEM VI

I, II.

It seemed to us that the answers to the first two questions depend on whether or not we shall have an effective international organization which will provide reasonable guarantees of collective security. If so, it will be unnecessary to reduce to a minimum the dependence of the United States on other countries for strategic war materials, and it will be unnecessary to place radical restrictions on the German and Japanese economies because of their war potentials. On the other hand, in the absence of organized collective security it will be almost impossible to keep the United States and our principal allies from seeking self-sufficiency in strategic war materials, and the clamor to reduce Germany and Japan to economic impotency will be almost irresistible. If such courses were followed, the economic havoc which would be entailed would be very great. Germans and Japanese kept in desperate economic straits would be subject to the same influences that led the Germans in the thirties to accept Hitler as the most hopeful way out of their desperate condition. In other words, it is our view that absence of an effective world organization would result in dangerous economic rivalries and in the collapse at least of German and Japanese economy with consequently severe repercussions on the economy of the rest of the world, and in the setting up of just such conditions as will be productive of further wars. The importance of answering questions I and II in the negative provides, therefore, a very strong argument for the creation and maintenance of an effective world organization.

Below you will please find the reactions of the Dartmouth Committee on Problem VI, International Economic Collaboration. The questions are those listed in the recapitulation of the analysis (page 13).

QUESTION I. The Covenant of the League of Nations enunciated the principle of reducing the armaments of each League member to the lowest point consistent with the requirements of (a) national safety and (b) the enforcement by common action of international obligations. The Dartmouth group endorse essentially the same principle with respect to strategic war materials. We assume that after this war the United Nations will take the lead in establishing some coercive agency - in the form of alliance, league, or otherwise - to curb international aggression. The members of this agency must have at their disposal whatever war materials they require to make good their commitments to curb aggression. But, the more comprehensive the membership of this agency, the smaller need be the amounts of war materials at the disposal of any single member. It is our hope that the membership of the coercive agency, which seems likely to consist at first chiefly of the more powerful of the United Nations, will grow more and more comprehensive with time, thus making it possible to increase each nation's dependence on others.

QUESTION II. In modern war, "economic war potential" is almost coextensive with "economic productive resources in general." Hence the substantial reduction of the more basic economic war potential of Germany and Japan must have disastrous economic (not to mention political) consequences. The Dartmouth group take the position that the armaments, rather than the potential, of Germany and Japan should be reduced relatively to those of the United Nations, and that this discrepancy should be coextensive with the danger that Germany and Japan would otherwise again become international aggressors.

QUESTIONS III, IV, and V. The connection between depression in any given country and depression in any other country or countries is established by the contacts of international trade and international finance. In general, the Dartmouth group hold that "independence" should give way to "collaboration", to the end of securing orderly change in the spheres of trade and finance.

International trade. The general objective of collaboration should be that of bringing the prices of internationally traded goods into line with comparative real costs and keeping them in line. Thus, domestic prices should respond to differences of comparative costs where they are not already in line with these differences, and they should also respond to changes in comparative costs. But they should not be made to respond to such "foreign influences" as currency depreciation and exchange blocking. On the contrary, collaboration should attempt to curb such influences themselves. Further, responses, or adjustments, should be orderly rather than violent. Thus, a nation whose internal economic equilibrium has long been under the influence of high import barriers must not be expected to remove these barriers suddenly. The barriers should be lowered, however, as rapidly as is consistent with the orderly establishment of a new internal equilibrium conforming with the pattern of comparative costs. The process might be speeded up by indemnifying at public expense the workers and investors of industries which must be contracted as a result of lowering the barriers.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY GROUP - REPORT ON PROBLEM VI

OCT 4 1945

Social Science Division
The Library of Congress

Copy

The Committee felt that in general this Problem as presented was extremely difficult to deal with. The answers depend so much on outside factors, in particular upon the existence or non-existence of a general international collective system, that the questions raised cannot really be isolated or treated alone. Furthermore, depending upon the assumptions concerning international security, the replies to the queries seem so obvious that they are hardly worthy of extensive analysis.

Q. I. Should each nation, and in particular the United States, endeavor after the war to reduce to the minimum its dependence upon other countries for strategic war materials?

A. We should not try to be completely independent of other countries in regard to war materials if we plan to take in any kind of international cooperative scheme. If we can assume that this country will be participating in measures to prevent future wars, an increase in economic interdependence will be desirable. Due to our fortunate position we will have a measure of independence in any event. However, if such cooperation seems unlikely it would then be advisable to reduce to a minimum our dependence upon the rest of the world for war materials, though even in such circumstances use of foreign supplies in peace time might be desirable in order to conserve our own resources for war.

Q. II. Should it be the policy of the United Nations, in the interest of their future military security, to keep down the economic war-potential of Germany and Japan, relatively to their own?

A. The United Nations should certainly attempt to control the economic war-potential of Germany and Japan for a while, provided proper techniques for so doing can be evolved. The Committee, though agreeing that something should be done along these lines, had grave doubts as to the feasibility of such measures. Furthermore, the establishment of an effective system of international security would tend to diminish the need of controls of German and Japanese economies. Many difficulties in connection with the application of such a policy can be foreseen, for example, any weakening of the Japanese and German economies endangers the economic welfare of all other states; also repressive measures may serve to stimulate German and Japan inventiveness, and cause them to devise means to circumvent international control. In other words, efforts to keep down German and Japanese war-potential may boomerang, and result in a worsening of economic standards and in preparations for new wars of revenge. However, until Germany and Japan can be led back to a position of equality in a world security system, or as long as no such system exists, it is inconceivable that Germany and Japan should be absolutely free to develop their war-potential as they please. Caught in a dilemma the United Nations must try to evolve controls which bring a maximum of security and a minimum of danger to international economic and political relations.

Q. III. Does a policy of international economic collaboration require the United States and other countries to abandon their independent anti-depression policies, in order that the domestic system of costs and prices may respond freely and flexibly to international influences; if so, should such independent policies be abandoned?

no 8
X-JX 27
LL5 #10
3
NORTHWESTERN COMMITTEE
UNIVERSITIES COMMITTEE ON POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS ON PROBLEM VI
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COLLABORATION

60
Public Affairs Section
The Library of Congress

At the tenth session of the Northwestern Committee on October 19, 1943, Professor George J. Gady offered eight recommendations and supporting arguments regarding Problem No. VI (International Economic Collaboration). Professors Ernest H. Mahne, James Washington Bell, Arthur E. Case and Ernest R. Mowrer offered amendments. In the eleventh session, these recommendations and amendments were further discussed. As finally revised, the recommendations and comments were adopted by a majority vote. A few dissenting opinions were offered, the text of which is given in this report.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) LEND-LEASE. A plan of partial cancellation of lend-lease obligations should be set up by the proper representatives of the State, Commerce, and Labor Departments. These representatives should also develop policies and methods of settling such obligations as may be offset by goods delivered or services rendered by debtor nations during the war and post-war periods. Considerations of justice and the necessity of avoiding both undue strain on national economics and the postponement of resumption of normal trade should guide policy.

(2) TARIFFS: Purely restrictive tariffs that bear no relationship to valid objectives of national or international economic planning or policy should be reduced or eliminated. This should be accomplished gradually and on a multi-lateral rather than on a bilateral or unilateral basis. Military strategy may dictate restriction of trade in critical materials, or some protection for local industries in the interest of war-time self-sufficiency - but these need not drastically curb the streams of peace-time international and interregional trade. Reciprocal trade agreements generalized through most favored nation clauses should be extended if wider multi-lateral agreements are impossible.

(3) NATIONAL ANTI-DEPRESSION POLICIES. Separate, autonomous, individual anti-depression policies, such as unilateral currency devaluations and purely national economic planning, should be tested with respect to their international impact, before they are initiated.

(4) WORLD CLEARING HOUSE. To expedite trade, regularize currencies, promote international investment, and force debtor or creditor nations to play their proper roles, there is need for a world clearing house or possibly a world bank. Such a plan should grow into function from definite though modest beginnings rather than be set up completely from detailed blueprints. The Keynes and White plans should be carefully and critically examined.

(5) SHIPPING. All arguments favorable to a continuation, under governmental subsidy if necessary, of the American merchant marine should be carefully and objectively evaluated. Genuine rather than alleged military necessity, economic considerations, rather than false national pride, should guide policy. It is possible that the sale or lease of excess shipping facilities, if any, to foreign shippers would result in advantageous international division of labor.

PROPOSED METHODS AND AGENCIES FOR INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC COLLABORATION
SHOULD AMERICA PARTICIPATE IN THEM?

At a meeting of the Northwestern University Group, on November 19, 1943, the following recommendations and comments, offered by Professor James Washington Bell, after discussion and amendment, were adopted as the consensus of opinion of the Group.

(1) It is in the interest of the United States to collaborate with other nations in order to prevent the disruption of foreign exchanges, to avoid the collapse of monetary systems and to facilitate the restoration and growth of a balanced international trade. As a first step, an international exchange stabilization fund or clearing union should be established by the key commercial countries, Great Britain, the United States and those countries whose currencies when stabilized, would enjoy the confidence of all trading nations. No large capital requirements should be needed in order to initiate the clearings and stabilization functions to be performed by this institution.

(2) It is in the interest of the United States to cooperate with other nations in making credit and capital available for the reconstruction and development of devastated and economically disorganized countries as well as for undeveloped countries. This cooperation should be primarily directed toward providing reasonably secure and stable economic and political conditions under which private investments would be forthcoming. Such use of government credit as might be necessary should be safeguarded as to sound purpose, reasonable amounts, and expectation of repayment.

(3) The United States should participate in a series of International Commodity Conferences for the purpose of evaluating methods for the solution of production and marketing problems, but should not enter into agreements involving price control, production, import and export quotas, nor for the purpose of purchasing marketing surpluses.

(4) We approve the Hull reciprocity (bilateral) trade agreements, but believe that the United States should participate in a series of conferences leading to multilateral agreements with nations desiring to promote foreign trade.

COMMENTS

(1) It is assumed that international economic collaboration will be based upon free enterprise economy as distinguished from a state controlled economy, like the USSR, Nazi Germany, or Fascist Italy, and upon an assured political and economic peace. The first question before us asks: Should the United States participate in, and make a large contribution to, an International Exchange-Stabilization Fund? Neither the Keynes Plan nor the White Plan is wholly acceptable. (a) We believe that internal monetary stabilization and the establishment of stable (calculable, dependable) external or foreign exchange relationships constitute the first step toward economic reconstruction. Secondly it is necessary to secure confidence and credit for all business activities. (b) Let us endeavor it for all countries to establish

JUL 4 1943

Stanford University
Library of Economics

Thirteen members of the Stanford group met on November 19, 1943, with Professor Turrentine as chairman, to consider Problem VIII: "Proposed Methods and Agencies for International Economic Collaboration. Should America Participate in Them?"

I. After the introduction of Question I by the chairman, the member best informed on this specific subject compared the fundamentals of the Keynes, the White and the Canadian plans and strongly criticized the phrasing of the question on two counts. (1) The question referred to an international exchange-stabilization "fund" although - in contrast to the White and the Canadian plans - the Keynes plan provides for no initial fund (i.e. no initial deposit of gold, exchange, or securities is required). (2) The wording of Question I appears to suggest that the United States is supposed to make contributions which would involve special sacrifices. Actually, the design and expectation are that every participating country will benefit from such an arrangement, and that the measure of United States' participation is the measure of the country's own interest. He favored broadening the question to refer to an international currency "constitution" and "institution."

The group as a whole felt that it was not competent to pass upon the highly technical specific issues involved in the several leading proposals. Some of these were nevertheless discussed. It chose to limit its expression of opinion to some basic questions of principle. Nine of the group, by a show of hands, affirmed their belief in the desirability of organized steps toward international collaboration in promoting stability in foreign-exchange relationships, in smoothing readjustments that may be needed, and in related monetary matters. No one voted in the negative, but a member who had devoted many years to the complex subject of foreign exchange expressed grave doubts as to the desirability or importance of such action. Another declared that the United States should preserve complete freedom of action in this field if international exchange stabilization might affect the domestic economy of the United States.

The group believed, however, that even a successful arrangement would not be a cure-all and that it would be a mistake to entertain excessive expectations of the contribution of the plan per se. Care should be taken that only extreme exchange fluctuations be checked, that rigid control be avoided, and that the control mechanism be not used to freeze a historical status quo. Indeed, one member emphasized that the pursuit of stability should not be consummated at the expense of flexibility and progress which, inevitably, means change also in the field of value ratios as between different currencies. Finally, the group was definitely opposed to any stabilization arrangement that would be set up and administered by the United States and Great Britain alone. Membership in any such arrangement should be as comprehensive as possible, including ex-enemy countries.

II. Regarding Question II, the group felt that an intergovernmental investment agency could serve useful purposes by encouraging and supervising the international flow of private capital. Special importance was attached to encouragement in the form of underwriting part of the risk involved in investments in some areas. Supervision should be restricted to the prevention of such abuses and unwise investments as occurred after World War I. An international agency also might be useful in preventing a sudden stoppage of a capital flow or the sudden recall of short-term capital funds as a reaction to political or economic disturbances.

X-JX 27 11-30-43
665
#13

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
Report on Problem VIII

Title: Proposed Methods and Agencies for International Economic Collaboration.
Should America Participate in Them?

Guides to Economic Change

OST 1
Serial Record Division
The Library of Congress

The Dartmouth Group respectfully submit the following propositions as a framework of reference for their replies to the questions raised in Problem VIII:

1. Desirable and undesirable changes. The quest for "stability" should not be permitted to disguise the fact that some changes in international trade and finance are desirable. In general, such trade and finance should conform with the pattern of comparative real costs of production, and should reflect changes in this pattern.

2. The rate and scope of change. The process of change should be more similar to a natural growth than to an act of mechanical reorganization. In its related dimensions of scope and rate, it is necessarily limited.

On the side of scope, changes in international economics must be predicated on the realities of international politics. In particular, plans for sweeping economic change are empty in a world which is full of aggression or the fear of it. Planned changes must be confined to the economies of nations between which it is reasonable to expect substantial and enduring political cooperation. For example, the nations signatory to the Moscow Declaration, since their political cooperation to keep the peace seems assured, constitute an area within which the planned regulation of international trade and finance can be realistic.

On the side of rate, desirable changes should not be permitted or encouraged to occur so rapidly as to cause a violent wrench to the established economic equilibrium. For example, no nation whose economy has long been under the strong influence of import barriers should undertake to lower these barriers with great rapidity. Or, to turn to the political counterpart of changes in international economics, close political co-operation between the powers signatory to the Moscow Declaration may well further the development of a super-national organization, but it is not reasonable to expect the establishment of a comprehensive "federal union" a short time after the end of the present war.

3. The cost of effecting changes. Any substantial economic change entails transitional frictions, and, therefore, costs. In general, these costs should fall on the beneficiaries of the change. Thus, if it is to the benefit of the American people at large to scale down our import barriers, then the American people at large should defray the costs of transferring labor and capital from fields of production injured by this policy and into fields aided by it. Further, it seems reasonable that public assumption of the costs would expedite change by reducing opposition to it.

Answers

1. (1) Yes, because violent exchange fluctuation would do heavy damage to our economy, and because our contribution must be large if the stabilization fund is to be sufficient to prevent such fluctuation. The fund should be used mainly to control such fluctuations as tend to be caused by exchange speculation and panic "flights" from given

#14

X-JX 27

.115

Report Adopted by

University of Pennsylvania Committee on Post-War Problems

Problem V

FILED OCT 4 1945
NO. B-115.1
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

3

OCT 4 1945

Social Science Division
The Library of Congress

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

Relief to Enemy-Occupied Countries (Question 1)

This Committee believes that the blockade should be partially broken now to feed starving peoples in the occupied countries of Europe. The reasons for this view are:

- A. Conditions in these countries are so appalling the humanitarian considerations have become paramount.
- B. There will be a distinct political gain for the Allied Nations because such relief will be convincing evidence of the principles for which they are fighting.
- C. Continued physical and psychological deterioration in the occupied countries will multiply the difficulties of reconstruction and rehabilitation when military resistance is over. A weakened population will be unable to give assistance in restoring or creating the institutions and procedures that will be needed in the years ahead.
- D. Relief promptly and generously given will make difficult such propaganda as was used after the First World War as a consequence of the blockade during and following that conflict.
- E. The grant of such aid will help to maintain among ourselves the human values which tend to deteriorate during a savage conflict.
- F. Recent experience in sending food to Greece and the testimony of the most competent experts, notably Herbert Hoover and the Friends' Service Committees, indicates that such relief can be granted through neutral agencies without aiding Germany.

It is recognized that there are difficulties of transportation and of administration to be overcome and that we are not competent to suggest procedures. We urge, however, that every effort be made to grant relief in every way that is consistent with the major task of securing the prompt and unconditional surrender of the enemy.

Any provision of supplies to occupied Europe during the War should not seriously delay the unconditional surrender of the enemy. Consistent with the attainment of this primary objective, relief to the starving people of conquered nations which will not give, directly or indirectly, appreciable aid to the Axis should be given to the extent that economic conditions and military requirements will permit. It is recognized, however, that the heavy demands of the War upon the resources and energies of the United Nations, the limitations of transportation facilities, the difficulties involved in developing an effective administrative agency qualified to preclude the diversion of such supplies to Axis

Report on Topics VI and VIII, International Economic Collaboration, and Proposed Methods and Agencies for International Economic Collaboration. Submitted for discussion December 3, 1943.

X-JX 27
115
#15
OCT 4 1945
Series Record Division
The Library of Congress

I. The Nature of International Economic Collaboration

- 1 International economic collaboration and international political collaboration are often two different but closely related aspects of the same set of activities. They are always closely related when economic collaboration is carried on under the terms of agreements between governments or is subject to the jurisdiction of a supra-national public body.
- 2 But not all economic collaboration involves political action in any direct manner. The organization of international cartels, for example, may be undertaken by collaboration between competing, or potentially competitive private economic interests in different countries without the sanction and without the knowledge of the governments of these countries. In some cases very powerful international economic controls over the market supply and the market price of vitally important commodities have been created in this way. Not infrequently the governments of the respective countries have been called in later to aid in enforcement of agreements thus privately arrived at, thus giving to the arrangement a mixed public and private nature. (E.g., cartels or other forms of agreement affecting sugar, wheat, etc.) Similarly, in the field of finance, formal or informal agreements may be entered into by investment banking interests in different countries for the promotion of private interests common to them all in one or more investment areas.
- 3 Because the formation and functioning of private international economic agreements in restraint of trade or industry like those described above, have often worked against the public interest of the countries concerned, and because their operations have sometimes served to increase international friction, it is assumed in the following discussion that, in the postwar world, international collaboration or agreement in restraint of trade or industry by private interests for private ends without supervision by an appropriate governmental agency should be eliminated. International economic collaboration is limited in connotation in this discussion to collaboration by governments, or by government agencies, or by private interests under government supervision.
- 4 There is no intent to restrict private contracts in connection with the conduct of foreign trade when not of a nature intended to restrict trade or industry. Since the desirability of a supra-national organization of some sort is taken for granted in all the discussions of this Group, it is assumed that the governmental agency to be entrusted with supervision will be an agency of such an organization. It is assumed also, without supporting argument except by implication, that the jurisdiction of this agency will extend to collaboration between governments, as in the case of tariff agreements, as well as to that between private interests.

II. Three Basic Prerequisites for the Success of International Economic Collaboration

- 5 1. The United Nations, particularly the "Big Four," must maintain a united front on peace terms - no under the table economic deals with the enemy by any one of them. Otherwise the economic set-up that actually appears after the ending of hostilities will not be one based upon international action but one grounded on divergent nationalist interests and ambitions.

PROPOSED METHODS AND AGENCIES FOR INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC COLLABORATION
SHOULD AMERICA PARTICIPATE IN THEM?

X-JX 27

. 11.5

#16

TRANSFER

OCT 1 1945

U.S. Armed Forces
The Library of Congress

I. We agree with Jacob Viner that "either plan (the White or Keynes plan) as it now stands would be a step forward" toward economic stability. As between them and the Williams plan, we prefer the more ambitious. We believe that the question of credits to weak members would require a careful exercise of judgment to distinguish between temporary and chronic cases of need. We believe that a reasonable degree of exchange flexibility could be stipulated without the complete laissez-faire which would prevail in the absence of any international authority. With the prospect of a propitiation of international economic anarchy, we have no sympathy.

Exchange rates are a matter of international concern if economic warfare is to be eliminated. Economic warfare may well lead to military warfare. We must discourage future resort to quotas, blocked currencies, and all other autarkic devices. The great powers possessed of capital and material resources must be prepared to shoulder responsibilities commensurate with their strength, as they are already committed to do in the case of relief and rehabilitation.

It seems a fair assumption that the stability as well as the volume of international trade (and both are closely connected) will help greatly to maintain employment and a high level of national income.

II. In the last war, private American bankers loaned money to England and to France, e.g. the Anglo-French loan. After we entered the war, we lent money as a government to our allies. In the period following the war, millions of dollars were privately loaned to Latin American governments and to many German municipalities and public utilities. A great deal of this money was permanently lost, or at least the interest on principal was temporarily in default.

In the present war, owing to the Johnson Act of 1934, our government has hit upon the device of Lend Lease. There is very little Lend Lease in reverse. We may as well think of it as an outright gift in kind (except as indicated in the British White Paper). In other words, our government is already participating in a sort of investment agency - investment in victory in this instance.

Naturally private bankers prefer private lending to an international investment agency. The same attitude is reflected in their opposition to savings bank insurance, to the Tennessee Valley Authority, and to the Export-Import Bank.

We are not called upon to decide here whether the United States is headed for socialism or not. Each case should be tried on its merits. We believe that an international agency in which the American people as a whole participate is preferable to private lending. An international agency eliminates the danger of "dollar diplomacy." It eliminates the temptation to "high pressure salesmanship," and if the risk proves in some instances to have been a poor one, the loss is borne by all the lenders impartially.

#17 X-JX 27
115
Report Adopted by

University of Pennsylvania Committee on Post-War Problems:

Problem VIII

PROPOSED METHODS AND AGENCIES FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COLLABORATION.
SHOULD AMERICA PARTICIPATE IN THEM?

Question I

Is it to the long-run interest of the United States to participate in, and make a large contribution to, an exchange-stabilization fund? (2) If so, should this fund be supplied and administered, so far as possible, by all the United Nations, or by the United States and Great Britain alone?

The question as worded apparently assumes that an agreement on international monetary matters would embody the establishment of a monetary reserve along the lines suggested in the White Plan rather than a mechanism, such as that proposed by Lord Keynes, which would dispense with any initial reserve. The validity of this assumption, as well as the desirability of such a choice, is open to doubt.

On the broader issue implied in the question we are, however, willing to express our conviction that it is definitely to the long-run interest of the United States to participate in efforts to establish more orderly international monetary conditions; and we should not be deterred from participating by the possibility that a substantial contribution may be required of this country. The benefits, economic and otherwise, of a smoothly functioning monetary system would far outweigh whatever its cost might be.

No program for international monetary reform should be made the private preserve of the United States and Great Britain. It should be the creature of as many of the United Nations as are willing to participate and should be open to all nations, including former enemies, provided they meet established requirements.

Question II

Is it to the interest of the United States to participate in, and make a large contribution to, an inter-governmental agency to provide and direct long-term loans for reconstruction and development in countries devastated or economically disorganized in consequence of the war and in undeveloped areas?

If proper precautions are observed it is to be hoped that the United States through public or private agencies will make international loans. Probably private loans of the type indicated cannot readily be secured in large amounts in the first years after the war. During that interval public loans or a guarantee of private loans will be appropriate. It is preferable that this be done through an International Investment Agency though judgment on this is difficult in the absence of a detailed plan for its organization and operation. If and when private investors enter the field it is important to have a better check on the nature and purposes for which such loans are made than we had shortly after the first World War. Perhaps adequate publicity for each loan, e.g. through the Securities and Exchange Commission, would be of some assistance.

Stanford University

Report on Problem VI

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COLLABORATION

X-JX 27

.665

Reference

#18

2

OCT 1943

Division of Economic
The Library of Congress

Copy

Eleven members of the Stanford group, with one guest, met on August 20, 1943, with Professor George W. Dorrie as chairman, to consider Problem VI: "International Economic Collaboration."

The discussion concerned itself first with the presentation of the problem in the analysis. It was recognized at the outset that the scope of the pamphlet was limited, and that a number of significant problems of international economic collaboration, such as that of international commodity control, were not included. The group felt some difficulty in discussing international economic relations without making some assumptions as to the character of the political relationships in the post-war world. This is not to say that the group felt the analysis should have assumed the existence of a centralized international organization; on the contrary, there was agreement that international economic collaboration would probably come about not so much through the establishment of large and spectacular supra-national machinery, but rather through agreements and associations of the nature of the International Postal Union and the International Labor Office.

In evaluating the propositions stated on page 3 of the analysis, the group took exception to the point of view expressed in the first proposition that it was "essential" that a country's customers absorb and pay for "all" its exports. It was thought that for the word "essential" the phrase, "to its self-interest" might be substituted, and that "ninety per cent of" would be a more moderate expression than "all."

With regard to the second proposition, the group felt that the final clause, "provided that economy in production-costs is not obtained through a subnormal standard of living," should be deleted. It appeared to open the door to protectionism, thus hamstringing the very principle of corporate advantage upon which the proposition itself is based. On the other hand, the group realized that although the proposition is acceptable, its application is not without difficulties - there are serious questions presented, for example, by nations like those of the Balkans, which are in a different stage of industrial development than are the more advanced countries.

With regard to the fourth proposition, the group questioned the conception of "natural monopolies" and felt that a more carefully worded statement of this premise should be worked out.

Question I. The group answered this question in the negative, pointing out that international economic collaboration does not need to be inconsistent with national security. Its cases in point were mentioned: Britain's choice of a new ruler on a self-sufficiency in wheat, and the present of certain German economists before the present war advocating such trade policies in order to develop national resourcefulness.

Question II. The group answered this question in the negative, favoring military control but not believing it should be extended to the economic life of all interested countries. In the first place, it is pointed out that it is not

Dernaum University

Report of Group Co-operating in the Discussion of Post-War Problems

Problem VI.

OCT

The Library of Congress

1. Should each nation, and in particular the United States, endeavor after the war to reduce to the minimum its dependence on other countries for strategic war materials?

Our group answered this question in the negative. This answer was based on two main considerations.

(a) The attempt to achieve such self-sufficiency would be against the economic interests of all countries involved. It would require the preservation or establishment of industries in countries which are not particularly suited for them, and the production within a country of raw materials which could be procured abroad more economically. This would lower standards of living not only in the country attempting to achieve self-sufficiency but also in the country which otherwise would export its products. And this in turn would create dissatisfaction which might contribute to another war.

(b) Over a long term, it is impossible to know what materials will be strategic war materials. Changes in methods of warfare or changes in technology may well bring unpredictable changes in the list. A country which attempted to achieve self-sufficiency in those materials now regarded as strategic might well be preparing for this war rather than the next one.

However, it was the feeling of the group that the government should invest in a form of war-risk-insurance along this line. That is, it should sponsor research work which might in time of war help us to get along even though foreign sources of supply are cut off, and should finance the production on a small scale of products (or substitutes therefor) which are normally secured abroad and which are likely to be vital in war. It was pointed out that the rubber situation in this country would have been far less critical if we had entered the war with greater knowledge of problems and methods in connection with the production of synthetic rubber.

2. Should it be the policy of the United Nations, in the interest of their future security, to keep down the economic war-potential of Germany and Japan, relatively to their own?

Our group has taken the attitude that the treatment of the defeated countries should be either ruthlessly severe or lenient and generous. If the former general policy is followed, then the economic war-potential of the defeated should be kept down, even to the extent of forbidding them to maintain certain industries which might easily be converted into war industries. If the latter general policy is followed, then no effort along this line should be made.

Our group favored the latter policy. The opinion was expressed (1) that reduction of the economic war-potential of the defeated would necessarily involve a reduction in standards of living which might lead to the rise of another Hitler, and (2) that a policy of ruthless severity is less likely to be followed strictly over a long period of time than a policy of lenience and generosity.

Our answer to the question was thus in the negative, provided that a

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COLLABORATION

(Based on a report of a sub-committee consisting of C. R. Whittlesey and E. H. Patterson)

Question I:

(Should each nation, and in particular the United States, endeavor after the war to reduce to the minimum its dependence on other countries for strategic war materials?)

The attitude to be taken on this question depends on our previous tentative conclusion in favor of an international organization capable of preserving peace (our report on Problem IV). Moreover the proposed effort to secure a high degree of independence of outside sources of supply of strategic war materials would indicate a lack of confidence in any plans or organization for the prevention of future war. Assuming the establishment of such an organization, with a definite hope of its success, there are several possible positions that might be taken. Two of them are:

1. That no effort be made by any nation to reduce its dependence for strategic war materials, because the attainment of any important degree of independence would of itself increase the chances of war. This may be reinforced by four further considerations.

- (a) The materials that are strategic for war are so numerous that the list would be indefinitely long and nothing like complete independence could be secured;
- (b) The border line between strategic war materials and materials for peace-time uses cannot be drawn;
- (c) Some of the most important of the materials currently strategic e.g. tungsten, are available only in other and distant countries; and
- (d) There are constant changes in the art of war and a list now satisfactory will probably soon be dated.

2. The other position likewise proceeds from the premise that any attempt to achieve a substantial degree of self-sufficiency for the United States or any other nation is undesirable as a long-run ideal. It would, however, lead to a gradual movement in the direction of abandoning such independence as we now enjoy with respect to the production of war-essential materials. It would consider the granting of help and encouragement to the production on a limited scale of certain materials, such as synthetic rubber, which can be produced within the country and the accumulation of stock piles of certain vital materials which must be imported.

It is urged that some agreement should be reached for these reserves to be dis-

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COLLABORATION

Report from the Smith College Group

COPY
Smith College Library
The Library of Congress

Question I. Should each nation, and in particular the United States, endeavor after the war to reduce to the minimum its dependence on other countries for strategic war materials?

If there is established some form of international cooperative organization for peace, backed by force, there would be no need for one nation to attempt to reduce to a minimum its dependence on other countries for strategic war materials. In the absence of a real prospect of long-run world peace, the United States should make such an attempt.

Question II. Should it be the policy of the United Nations, in the interest of their future military security, to keep down the economic war-potential of Germany and Japan, relatively to their own?

The term "economic war-potential" is so broad as to be almost meaningless. Germany and Japan must develop a certain degree of industrial and agricultural production if they are to avoid starvation, and yet in total war any such production might conceivably be regarded as a "war-potential." We favor a substantial degree of agricultural and industrial development, subject to restriction of activities directly related to waging war.

Question III. Does a policy of international economic collaboration require the United States and other countries to abandon their independent anti-depression policies, in order that the domestic system of costs and prices may respond freely and flexibly to international influences; and if so, should such independent policies be abandoned?

A good deal can be done to promote domestic stability without necessarily running counter to international stability. For example, a purely domestic public works program might be so managed as to contribute directly to alleviating depression conditions in one country, and by so doing constitute a reduction in the forces leading to world depression, rather than the reverse. In general, national prosperity and world prosperity are not antithetical, but rather the reverse. Where a real conflict of interest arises, internationalism rather than nationalism could properly be the better policy to follow.

REPORT TO BRYN MAWR COMMITTEE ON PROBLEM 5: RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

8

001

Memorandum by Dr. Hertha Kraus
(Associate Professor of Social Economy, Bryn Mawr College)

Division of Social Sciences
The University of Chicago

A clarification of the problem of relief in relation to post-war conditions is greatly needed. As the pamphlet and many other publications on the subject indicate, foreign "relief" covers a wide range of activities financed in many different ways. The term relief as used in connection with post-war programs is divorced from its normal connotation. It covers straight-forward business transactions, e.g. the sale of basic commodities against gold or other assets, as well as deliveries on credit terms. While profits earned in such operations together with some voluntary gifts have been used as free contributions, their sum total accounted only for a small percentage of all deliveries within the so-called relief operations during and after the last war. (See League of Nations: Relief Deliveries and Relief Loans, 1919 to 1923, page 7 and 8.)

Controversy is caused when the substantial expenditures of these programs are mistakenly considered to be charity, private or governmental. A temporary social policy facilitating such far flung enterprises seems particularly questionable when unrelated to domestic needs and domestic social and financial policies.

It is essential to understand the series of programs called "foreign relief" as an instrument only, which may be used for different purposes depending on the objectives of such use.

The merits of their operation can not be judged, nor can desirable policies in regard to the sponsorship, initiation, termination, correlation, and financing of their activities be defined without previous agreement on the basic objectives of the entire undertaking.

The relief concept as such can not be clarified by analyzing the content of a number of programs nor the types of commodities or skills utilized within their operations. In all programs agencies have introduced substantial quantities of commodities into a receiving country where they may regulate in detail the policies and procedures of internal distribution up to the ultimate consumer. In some programs the distribution has been organized in the form of a service to individuals, aiming at direct contact with them and possibly at their treatment. In other programs imported goods have been allocated to existing commercial or social agencies and institutions helping them to resume or expand their traditional functions.

While most of the well-known foreign relief programs have been largely commodity-centered and have used imported staff to protect and control commodities and to arrange for their allocation, other programs have been more service-centered. In the latter case the use of professional skills and the bringing in of professional workers and technical experts has been an essential part of the plan. This importation of skills has supplemented existing professional services in the receiving community, and fostered the production of new community services related to specific shortages in a service.

Imported commodities have - in addition to huge quantities of food stuffs -

X-JX 561

.A2

#12

Relación de Tratados y

3
2
50



Convenciones Panamericanas

firmados por el Ecuador

DEPARTAMENTO DE ACTOS Y ORGANISMOS
INTERNACIONALES

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores del Ecuador

SERIE: Instrumentos Internacionales

1947

Edit. "Fr. Jodoca Ricks"

X-JX1311

#24

THE TWELVE GEOGRAPHICAL ZONES
GOVERNMENTS OF THE WORLD

BY

RUDOLPH DENKE

X-JX1341

64-2854
copy A #25

TRADE
PEACE
PROSPERITY

NEWS
INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW
NEWS

X-JX 1564

61-7539



TO DESTROY NAZISM OR TO REWARD IT?

AN ASPECT OF THE QUESTION OF SLOVENE CARINTHIA

BY ~~Dr. FRAN~~ ZWITTER
PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LJUBLJANA

YUGOSLAV INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
BEOGRAD 1947

61-7539

1.5X1524
15

Yugoslavias Struggle



FOR PROPER RELATIONS
BETWEEN
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES



X-JX1564
-5

YUGOSLAVIAS

foreign policy

by

EDWARD KARDELJ

VICE-PREMIER OF YUGOSLAVIA


AND

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

BELGRADE 1949

61-75-9-2-

X-JX1564
5



#29

A NEW BLACKMAIL

2

AN EVALUATION

of the Western policy toward Tito and the Trieste problem. It is based on information gathered by the Serbian National Defense Council of America. Reproduction of the material contained herewith is permitted without request.

For further information about the organization
see inside front cover.

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
December 1st, 1963

X-JX1907

I5 170

BUREAU INTERNATIONAL DE LA PAIX

Fondé en 1891 par le Congrès Universel de la Paix à Rome

Grand Prix à l'Exposition Universelle de Paris

Lauréat du Prix Nobel 1911



Qu'a fait ? Que fait le Bureau International de la Paix ?

Brève Notice offerte par le Bureau
International de la Paix à l'occasion de son
Jubilé, à ses amis de Suisse, et aux person-
nes et établissements dont il sollicite l'appui.

8, RUE CHARLES-BONNET, 8
GENÈVE

Chèques et Virements Postaux 1505

Téléphone 50.000

61-75 X-JX 4265

Exclusion of Hindus
from America
Due to British
Influence

LIBRARY
JUL 21 8 1928
COPY
EXCHANGE & NET DIVISION

#31



— BY —
RAM CHANDRA
Editor
"Hindustan Gadar"
San Francisco, Cal.
U. S. A.

61-72
X-JX 4265
UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

#32

REGISTRATION CARD

OF ALIEN FEMALE 181978

(Under Proclamation of the President, dated April 12, 1918)



Issued to _____


Address _____

The finder of this card shall immediately restore it, if possible,
to the person to whom it was issued; otherwise forward it to the
United States Marshal.

7-1124

61-7559-2 - X-JX 4265

Registration of Aliens #33



The Board of Directors has ordered that the report appearing in this pamphlet should be printed and placed for consideration before the Chamber's Fourteenth Annual Meeting, at Washington, May 11, 12 and 13, 1926



CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
MARCH, 1926

61-7559-2-234

X-JX 4265

#34

The Case of Rosika Schwimmer

Alien Pacifists Not Wanted!

SEP 18 1978

EXHIBIT COPY

¶ Among all the decisions of the Supreme Court since the war adverse to civil liberty, none violate the old traditions more squarely than this.

¶ In a country founded on principles of religious freedom and liberty of conscience, the Supreme Court has now refused to admit to citizenship persons who disbelieve in bearing arms in its defense. And this in the case of a 50 year old woman who would never be called on to bear arms!

¶ The decision would apply equally to Quakers and members of other religious sects whose principles forbid taking part in war.

¶ Already in recent years for the first time in our history courts have refused to grant citizenship to an Irish Quakeress, a Mennonite woman, a Seventh Day Adventist and a member of the Church of the Brethren,—all because of their religious objections to bearing arms.

¶ And yet most of our state constitutions and the draft act during the war specifically exempted members of such sects from bearing arms. Our law recognized that in a conflict between a citizen's duty to his God and his duty to his State, God should prevail.

Congress can change the naturalization law. A bill has been introduced to overcome the Supreme Court decision. Support it.

Read the facts of this case and help!

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

100 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK CITY

June, 1929.

181

10 cents

61-7551-2

#35



*The Registration of Aliens,
Voluntary or Compulsory,
A Dangerous Project*

+

Supplementary Pamphlet

Edited by

MAX J. KOHLER

LEAGUE FOR AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP
NEW YORK
1930

61-7559-2

JAN 1945
#36

Help Admit

Alien Pacifists

To Citizenship!



BILLS to overcome the decisions of the Supreme Court denying citizenship to those who refuse to promise to bear arms in time of war have been introduced in Congress. They are intended to clear up the issue raised by the cases of Mme. Rosika Schwimmer, of Prof. Douglas Clyde Macintosh of Yale and of Miss Marie A. Bland of New York.

In those decisions the court, by a close majority, held that aliens who do not promise to render military service in time of war can be barred from citizenship, and that it is proper for the Department of Labor to inquire into their opinions and beliefs on that subject.

The dissenting opinions recognized the traditional rights of conscientious objectors to bearing arms in war, and maintained that Congress had not exacted a pledge to bear arms from applicants for citizenship. Chief Justice Hughes pointed out in his dissenting opinion that the majority of the court had merely *inferred* that Congress had exacted such a promise by implication. He made it plain that Congress could act to prevent such questions being asked of applicants. Once they become citizens, they would of course be on precisely the same footing as all others in regard to war service.

TWO bills have been introduced,—one in the Senate and one in the House. In the Senate, Bronson Cutting of New Mexico has introduced a bill (S.3275) drafted by the lawyers connected with the litigation, of which the substance reads as follows:

"But an alien otherwise qualified shall not be denied citizenship under any provisions of this act solely by reason of his refusal on conscientious grounds to promise to bear arms or otherwise participate

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

100 FIFTH AVENUE

New York City


February, 1932

181

61-7544-1-2
X
NATIONAL COUNCIL
on
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP

490 West End Avenue
New York City

Telephone ENdicott 2-8722



X
Address

DIFFERENCES IN RATE OF NATURALIZATION OF IMMIGRANT GROUPS

X
By Ruth Z. Bernstein
Secretary, National Council on Naturalization and Citizenship

Before meeting of National Council on Naturalization and Citizenship
at the National Conference of Social Work
Atlantic City, N.J., May 28, 1936.

A study of the difference in the rate of naturalization of various nationality groups, is not a new field of investigation. This question has been considered many times in the past. In its more popular form it is the old question of who are more easily assimilated, the old immigrant, that is the immigrant from north-western Europe, or the new immigrant, the immigrant from southern and southeastern Europe. Of course, informed people who have discussed this question have been fully aware that naturalization does not mean assimilation, but, since it was measurable, the facts of citizenship were generally given a great deal of weight as an index of assimilation. It seems rather strange that having found such an index the three main investigators of this subject came to very different conclusions. The Immigration Commission of 1907 found that the new immigrant was less easily assimilated. John Palmer Gavit in "Citizens by Choice" holds that the indications are that the "new" immigrants are even more interested in citizenship than the "old". Niles Carpenter in his chapter on Citizenship in "Immigrants and their Children" concluded that certain figures indicate that the "old" were more easily assimilated, while other figures indicate just the opposite. Later, in analyzing the methods used in these three studies, it will be more evident why such diverse conclusions were reached. With three authorities disagreeing there is little wonder that there is much popular confusion in the thinking on this question. It therefore seemed advisable to not only analyze any new material available, but to examine carefully the methods of the previous studies with the hope of discovering why their results were so conflicting.

The most important new material that has become available since the last of the three studies is the 1930 census. This is particularly interesting because it came at a period when certain of the old immigrant groups were becoming "new". For example 39.6% of the immigrants from Scotland entered in the 1920-30 decade. When men alone are considered, this change in type of immigration is even more evident.

61-7559-2 -
Copy A

X-JX 265

#38

Citizenship for Alien Pacifists



FOR EVIDENTIARY PURPOSES.
~~THIS PUBLICATION~~ MUST NOT BE
~~MARKED IN ANY MANNER EXCEPT~~
~~WHERE FILE NUMBERS ARE.~~

*The issue again
before the courts*

■

Use the coupon on back page

=====

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
31 Union Square West
New York City

61-1559-2
X - JX 4265
#39

**THE
STRANGE CASE
OF THE
FILIPINOS
IN THE
UNITED STATES**

By
MAXIMO C. MANZON

FOR EVIDENTIARY PURPOSES.
THIS PUBLICATION MUST NOT BE
MARKED IN ANY MANNER EXCEPT
FIVE CENTS
WHERE FILE NUMBERS ARE.



61-7557

X-JX 4265

#49

*Italian
Americans
and the War*



By PETER V. CACCHIONE

1c.


61-7559-2-

X-JX 4265

COPY B

#41

COMMON COUNCIL



for

AMERICAN UNITY

Foreign Language Information Service



FOR EVIDENTIARY PURPOSES
THIS REPLICATION MUST NOT BE
MARKED IN ANY MANNER EXCEPT
WHERE FILE NUMBERS ARE

#42

61-7559-2 X-JX 4265

THE REGISTRATION OF ALIENS

copy 3



PUBLICATION FILE


BY HON.

VITO MARCANTONIO

MEMBER OF CONGRESS
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
CAREY McWILLIAMS

2c.

Has furnished X-JX 4265
Travel Agency for distribution to his
German clients.



X ANSWERS FOR ALIENS

PAMPHLET IV

X How to Become a Legally Resident Alien

DO YOU KNOW

?

How to establish your legal admission to the United States?

What documents may be required?

How to terminate you status as an alien?

How deportation prevents an application for admission?

How to obtain a stay of deportation?

That lack of legal admission may bar your relatives from entering the United States?

PRICE 25c

Copy A 61-7551-2-53
dis., 1940

#44

61-1559-2-1945

Copy A X-IX 4265

~~X~~ Alien ~~X~~ Legislation and ~~X~~ American ~~X~~ Democracy



~~X~~ FOREIGN LANGUAGE INFORMATION SERVICE
INCORPORATED

222 Fourth Avenue, New York City

940

61-7051-2-6 X-JX 4265

copy B

#45



UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION PROCEDURE

HOW TO BECOME
AN AMERICAN CITIZEN

10c

American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born

#46

61-7557-2-

B

X-JX 4265

NO GESTAPO in AMERICA

FOR EVIDENTIARY PURPOSES.
THIS PUBLICATION MUST NOT BE
MARKED IN ANY MANNER EXCEPT
WHERE FILE NUMBERS ARE.

by the HON. VITO MARCAN-

TONIO . . . a radio address

. . . on present and immediate

dangers to the peace and

civil liberties of the American

people . . . on concentration

camps . . . on mass raids and

arrests . . . on hysteria against

the foreign born . . . with an

introduction by HUGH DE

LACY, National Chairman,

American Committee for Pro-

tection of Foreign Born . . 2C


61-1554-2-34

X-JX 4265



#47

~~X~~
**AMERICANS OF
FOREIGN BIRTH**



IN THE

WAR PROGRAM FOR VICTORY

By ~~X~~


Hon. Earl G. Harrison



~~X~~ *American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born*

Including a Special Message from

President Franklin D. Roosevelt



ENCLOSURE

NON-CITIZEN AMERICANS


61-407-408 in the
WAR EMERGENCY

X-JX 4265

HON. FIORELLO H. LA GUARDIA

MAYOR, CITY OF NEW YORK

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE



#49

X I Am A
PATRIOT

X-JX 4265

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
3
SEP 18 1978
COPY
EXCHANGE & GIFT DIVISION



Malice for None Justice for All

Copyright 1941 by John J. Otto

AMERICAN SLAV CONGRESS
Book-Cadillac Hotel, Room 849
Detroit, Michigan

April 25-26, 1942



~~★~~
SPEECH DELIVERED BY GEO. F. ADDES AT THE AMERICAN SLAV CONGRESS
APRIL 25, 1942

Salutation:

To this great assemblage - the Congress of American Slaves - I am very happy to bring to you the greetings of over 700,000 members of the Organization which I have the privilege to represent, the United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAWA-CIO.

It is an organization of which I am proud to be a member. It is an organization that thousands upon thousands of your great peoples are proud to be members of. It is an organization that pays humble tribute to the peoples of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and all Slav races in Europe for their heroic and continued opposition to the ruthless bloodthirsty armies of Hitler. To the workers of Poland and Czechoslovakia who, ground under the iron heel of Hitler's Army of Occupation - their every move likely to bring death - are yet in the face of all this continuously finding ways and means of sabotaging the production of arms. To the valiant people of Yugoslavia who, with unbelievable heroism, refused to peacefully accept the demands of Hitler and his gang of plunderers and are still under the able leadership of General Mee-hah-lah-wich, harrassing the Axis armies by guerilla warfare. To the peoples of Bulgaria who have defied their King in his attempts to furnish his boy friend, Hitler, with an army to fight their brother and sister Slavs.

It is an organization that pays tribute to the great army and peoples of the Soviet Union, Russia, with an army that even our best military men said could not withstand the Nazi war machine for more than three or four months. Russia, beaten back by the fast moving panzer division of the Nazi armies - her armies, according to the paperhanger from Austria whipped and ready to be mopped up - that same Russia, inspired by a love of country and freedom, is fighting back with a courage and determination unsurpassed in all history, and across the headlines of our papers only two or three days ago, we read "Nazis reel under great Soviet drive."

We pay tribute to all our great Allies - Great Britain, China, the Dutch and the peoples of all Nations that have taken up the challenge to defend freedom and independence.

Your Congress is meeting here today at one of the most crucial periods in our history. Never since 1776 have the freedoms, which we cherish so much and will fight to defend to our last drop of blood, been in such deadly peril. Our armies have been forced to give ground. Our Navy has suffered severe losses. The enemy is taking a heavy toll of our shipping. It is not altogether a pleasant picture to contemplate.

#51

61-1537

X-JA-265



AMERICAN SLAV CONGRESS
Book-Cadillac Hotel, Room 849
Detroit, Michigan

PRESS RELEASE
April 26, 1942

An address by Paul V. McNutt, Chairman of the War Manpower Commission and Federal Security Administrator.

Mr. Gunther, Mr. Zeman, Honored Guests and Fellow Americans:

I have a feeling that in uniting here this afternoon you have created an occasion touched with destiny. The whole world will hear about this meeting of the first Slav American Congress. It will be as heartening to our Allies as the news of a victory. It will be as bitter to our enemies as the news of a defeat.

The Axis strategy of Divide and Conquer did not envisage this meeting.

Hitler did not dream of it when he boasted:

"America will be easy to conquer. It is not a Nation. It is the raw materials of a Nation."

Today, by coming here, you have given Hitler the lie.

American unity is something dictators cannot understand. It is the blind spot in their plan for world conquest. Tyrants, mesmerized by the myth of a superior race, cannot realize that Americans from all lands are one people, sharing one blood--the blood of free men.

Geography is an accident. Differences of language and custom are trivialities. You were Americans before you or your fathers ever landed. One deep desire makes you kin of the Pilgrims and those other brave men who have come here from the beginning, yearning to breathe free, seeking the same things--opportunity, liberty, justice, human dignity.

They know the worth of human dignity in outraged Greece.


They know--tootlate--in France what was lost when their conquerors chipped the words "Liberte", Egalite', Fraternite' from the marble facade of Paris.

And you, because these are your brothers and cousins and former neighbors, share their knowledge.

Hitler has always shuddered at the thought of freedom-loving democratic Nations uniting against the Axis powers. In some of the countries from which you came age-old feuds have raged for thousands of years. Hitler counted on these feuds to be his allies in America as they had been in Europe.

You may be sure that the Axis has used every device in its power to spread confusion, hatred and discord among us. But you are Americans. Thanks to a free press, free radio and free speech, and your own common sense, you have refused to succumb to this crude enemy plot.

AMERICAN SLAV CONGRESS
BOOK-CADILLAC HOTEL, Rm 849
APRIL 25-26, 1942
DETROIT, MICHIGAN



RESOLUTION TO ALL SLAV YOUTH
ON THE FIGHTING FRONTS:

To you brothers and sisters, you Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croations, Slovenes, Bulgarians, Carpatho-Russians, and Macedonians, who are fighting courageously against the barbarian murderers -- Hitler and his Axis might -- we the youth delegates assembled in the First Congress of American Slavs greet your indomitable spirit and bring you a message of the resolve and dedication of the United Slav youth in America to forge the weapons of war, to furnish the man-power, the soldiers and the firm determination to destroy forever our common enemy, Hitler and his nefarious Nazi fascist Axis powers, and to help restore to you the freedom, justice, and equality for which you have sacrificed so much. Be brave have faith, fight on. America in all her power and unity is on her way to help for Victory.

GENERAL RESOLUTION ON YOUTH PANEL

We the youth delegates to the First Slav Congress of America heartened by the brave and valient fight of our Slav kinsmen in Europe against the treacherous and murderous agressor and invader, are determined to stand united under the Stars and Stripes and to work together for the common purpose of destroying Hitler and his Axis power, and we pledge our fullest support and cooperation to achieve maximum war effort and war production so that our American soldiers and the soldiers of our Allies will have the weapons for a speedy victory, so that we may preserve to ourselves and our posterity, freedom and the American way of life without which ultimate victory would be in vain.

We also express our wholehearted approval of the First American Slav Congress, and the purposes and resolutions enumerated by it. And in conclusion we express our full support of President Roosevelt's statement for taking the offensive to the heart of the Nazi enemy by the opening of a Second Front at the earliest moment.

The youth delegates feel that their participation would not be complete unless the Congress approved at least two youth representatives on the permanent Congress Committee.

#53

61-75

X-IX 9265

~~RESOLUTION ON CHINESE WAR RELIEF~~



CHINESE

The American Slav Congress calls upon all American Slaves to support China War Relief, to the end that the indomitable peoples of China, who have fought the fascist aggressors for year after year, first unaided and alone, now side by side with the millions upon millions of peoples of the United Nations, shall not suffer without succor until the banner of freedom waves the world 'round.

Recommend incoming officers be authorized to devise means and methods of carrying this out.

RESOLUTION AGAINST FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES

As the war enters its crucial stage, the activities of the fifth column are intensified and its efforts to divide, disrupt and disunite increase. As an integral and important section of the American people, the responsibility falls upon us, in molding the essential unity of the American Slaves, to repudiate the defeatists, fascists, fifth columnists and all the enemies of America and the cause of the United Nations.

All hindrances that impede our all-out effort to win the war must be removed. We cannot permit victory to be obstructed by the activities of those elements in our midst who would disrupt national unity by driving a wedge between us and our allies, spreading anti-American, anti-British and anti-Soviet propaganda, and by other means, whether these people are to be found in the halls of Congress, in the ranks of industry and labor or in our own American Slav organizations and communities. Defeatism with the object of demobilizing and demoralizing our people and making possible sabotage and fifth column activity must be drastically eliminated.

We fully concur with our President that the strengthening and maintenance of national unity imposes upon us the solemn obligation to assure the election of men and women to Congress devoted to the winning of the war, irrespective of party affiliations.



Historic

AMERICAN SLAV CONGRESS

April 25th, 26th, 1942

Detroit, Michigan



UNITY
PRODUCTION
WAR BONDS
WAR RELIEF


"American Slavs, Unite For Victory!"

REPRODUCTION FILE

#55

Copy B

61-7559-2-



THE GERMAN AMERICANS AND THE WAR

REPORT
OF THE
GERMAN AMERICAN EMERGENCY CONFERENCE
HELD IN NEW YORK CITY
ON MARCH 1, 1942

FOR BIBLIOTRARY POSSESSION
THIS ITEM IS NOT TO BE
REPRODUCED IN ANY MANNER EXCEPT
WHERE FILE NUMBERS ARE

revised and reprinted
9-3-42
T.H.F.

Published by
German American Emergency Conference
305 Broadway (Room 409), New York City

To Prevent
World War III

61-4561-2-298
JX 4265
#56
15 Cents

Would YOU sign
this letter...

?

Introduction by

Quentin Reynolds
Rex Stout

#57



1944... Crucial Year

The Need of *Dynamic* Unity in the
Immigrant Groups

Two Addresses by
LOUIS ADAMIC

FOR EVIDENTIARY PURPOSES.
THIS PUBLICATION MUST NOT BE
MARKED IN ANY MANNER EXCEPT
WHERE FILE NUMBERS ARE.

Copy B
61-7559-2-5100
THE UNITED COMMITTEE OF
SOUTH-SLAVIC AMERICANS

1010 Park Avenue, New York 28, N. Y.

100-57994-1172

LETTER TO AN OLD-LINE AMERICAN OF ANGLO-SAXON STOCK

* Louis Adamic's new book *A NATION OF NATIONS* is dedicated to his friend Merritt H. Perkins, to whom he addresses a letter which serves as the preface (somewhat abbreviated here):

Dear Merritt: I dedicate *A Nation of Nations* to you first because your interest in the "project" of which it is a part has meant a great deal to me during the past half-dozen years, and second because you are a New Englander whose Puritan ancestors came to America in the 17th century and helped to shape the beginnings of the civilization and culture of the Colonies which became the first thirteen United States. And with your permission I dedicate it through you to other Americans of Anglo-Saxon stock, whether the story of their background in the New World begins with Jamestown or Plymouth Rock, with the Protestants of the Massachusetts Bay Colony or the Catholics who settled in Maryland, with Roger Williams in Rhode Island or Thomas Hooker in Connecticut, with John Mason in New Hampshire or William Penn in Pennsylvania. I offer it also, if I may, to those who—unlike you—occasionally remark, "Why don't you go back where you came from?"

Remember our long talk when we first met in 1938? Somehow it took us no time at all to get acquainted. Soon you were telling me about the diaries and letters recently come into your possession after lying for a century or more in a trunk in the attic of your family home in western Massachusetts. They gave a vivid picture of life in a New England town before the Revolution, and I liked the warmth and excitement with which that picture filled you.

I asked if you had heard of the "America letters" written by Scandinavian, Dutch, Polish and other immigrants to relatives in their old countries. You said you had not, and I described them. You were interested, which was all I needed. Presently I went on to say that the whole of American history could stand rethinking, rewriting . . . that the Negroes' American tradition of fighting for liberty dates from 1526; that a handful of Polish, German and Armenian workers at Jamestown, Virginia, in 1619 staged one of the first rebellions in the New World; that John Peter Zenger, a German printer in the 1730s whom the governor of New York jailed for publishing attacks on his regime, fathered the American ideal of freedom of the press; that Philip Mazzei, the Italian friend and neighbor of Thomas Jefferson, influenced the Revolution of 1776; that the Irish were vastly important in the War of Independence and in shaping the polity and destiny of the United States. . . .

Just then I was coming upon many neglected bits of Americana and I guess I was trying them out on you. I had an idea that I might write some such book as this, for which I needed not only facts buried in obscure prints and manuscripts but also contact with contemporary Americans of as many backgrounds as possible. I was traveling over the country checking up on my feelings and notions, and you and I chanced to meet in Denver.

You mentioned your family papers again. And I told you of a recent experience in your New England when, walking through the elm-shaded cemetery of a lovely old town, reading the names and dates and epitaphs on the stones leaning this way and that, I had suddenly felt a wonderful sensation of intimacy with early America. I was unable to analyze the feeling verbally. It wasn't necessary. Your face lighted up.

You got me to talk about the people I had been meeting, and I told you of the two days I had spent at a farmhouse north of Bemidji in Minnesota listening to an old immigrant from Norway. He had known O. E. Rølvaag, the author of *Giants in the Earth*, and as he spoke about him his own being seemed to

shine. His English had an accent but the meaning of the words came clear. In and around and through what he said I got a feeling of the churning inside of America.

He told me of an "Americanization" campaign in that part of Minnesota around 1905. A poster appeared on walls in little towns and on tree-trunks by the roadsides. It was a picture of an elegant Uncle Sam and an outlandish yokel. In a loop coming out of Uncle Sam's handsome mouth was the word *Yes*, the loop from the yokel's wide-open mouth read *Ya*, and across the top in big letters was the admonition: "Don't say 'Ya' say 'Yes'!"

"That placard," said the old man, "it was as though pasted on a wall in our home and I couldn't pull it down. My oldest boy ran away. The children could not forgive their mother and me that we were 'foreigners.' They would not let us say anything in Norwegian to them—anything intimate. They held us away. It was years before that placard wore off enough for the run-away to come back."—

You nodded slowly—a shadow on your face—as you did when I told you about a Negro friend of mine in Washington whose words and personality, encompassing a big part of the American Story, had repeatedly impressed me, but with whom I could not lunch anywhere outside the Negro section of the National Capitol except at the Union Depot.

We talked of other things—a bit about ourselves, getting the range of each other's experience and interests. Given to understatement, you spoke quietly, slowly; from me words sometimes tumble out too fast for precise articulation or meaning. You were born in Massachusetts during the Great Blizzard of 1838; I was born eleven years later at a place that became part of Yugoslavia. You had moved to the Rockies as a young man; I came to the United States at fifteen. You were a businessman with a deep, natural interest in the humanities, in painting and writing, in manners and good taste. You were, I judged, a man of quick perception; outwardly calm, inwardly perturbed about some things in the United States. Focused on the Anglo-Saxon-Protestant phase of America, you were wide-open to other phases as well.

I don't know what was in the back of your mind as we talked; in mine was: "We're both Americans." This had been my unspoken thought many times in the previous months. It had been there while the old Norwegian immigrant was telling me of his life in Minnesota. You and he were as different superficially as two men could well be, yet you had much in common. And you and I had things in common, different as we were.

You asked me to amplify my remark that our history could stand rethinking and revision.

I wasn't any too clear. There was an enormous mass of American history, I said, that did not appear in the standard books; what did appear was fallacious in its emphases. And the trouble was not just with the books; the fallacy diffused throughout our national life and thought. It was like a fog rolling about, spreading everywhere in the American atmosphere, and without a palpable center. The nearest thing I

Here [in these United States] at last is something in the doings of man that corresponds with the broadcast doings of the day and night. Here is not merely a nation but a teeming nation of nations.

—WALT WHITMAN, Preface to 1855
Edition of *Leaves of Grass*.


61-7557-2-5876 copy A

#59

61-7551-2

THE ^{*}ARMENIANS
of the UNITED
STATES and CANADA

BY
JAMES H. ^{*}TASHJIAN



IRELAND

and the

IRISH

in the U.S.A.



X-7X 4265
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

18 1978
COPYRIGHTED
FREE & GIFT DIVISION

by JAMES

LARKIN

Labor Member of the Irish Parliament

10c

#61

61-7559-X-TX 4265

Copy A



*Citizens without Rights

#62

~~X~~
STOP!
PASSAGE OF
THE DIES BILL

~~X~~
**THE DIES BILL
EXPOSED**

**THE DIES BILL—
AN UN-AMERICAN
PROPOSAL WHICH
MUST BE DEFEATED**

Detached From
100-3-86-14
3/19/53




~~X~~
**AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
CONFERENCE BOARD, INC.**

41 Park Row
New York City

X-JX 4265

#63

61-7557-2-1119



Ireland's Fight for Freedom and the Irish in the U.S.A.

BY

SEAN MURRAY

Price 5 Cents

X AMERICA
SOCIAL

X-5X 4765

#64

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
3
SEP 18 1978

X *Keep Up the*

Fight for
Americanism



A Message

from

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

copy A

61-7559-2-840


225 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK
TEL. MURRAY HILL 3-3933-4

#65

Copy A

X-JX 4265

SEP 18 1978



WHAT PRICE ALIENS IN AMERICA?

CHICAGO COUNCIL FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN
BORN WORKERS,

Room 48, 106 N. La Salle St., Chicago, Ill.

61-7559-2-1314

Edith Rudquist

61-755 X-5X 4205

*

Rights of Foreign Born Americans #66



By George W. ~~Cro~~ckett, Jr.
Counsel
Michigan Committee
for Protection of Foreign Born

#67

X-5X 4765



APPRECIATE AMERICA



Here Is Why!

61-7551-2-42 A
copy

GERMAN-AMERICAN LEAGUE FOR CULTURE

39 WEST ADAMS STREET

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

X-JX 4-65



(Incorporated)

CONSTITUTION
And
BY - LAWS

Federation
SONS OF COLUMBUS
Of America

PITTSBURGH, PA.

#69

What Are We Waiting For?



Not Europe -



But New Jersey!

From THE NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE

19 WEST 44th STREET,

NEW YORK

E. L. Harvey, Publicity Director

X-JA4265

4 #70

Abuse of Hospitality

(Written by AGNES REPPLIER for the National Security League.)

Whenever a revolutionary mob assembles, as it did in Madison Square Garden, New York City, recently, to threaten the downfall of the United States, reporters casually observe: "A large audience, ninety per cent. foreign, applauded these anarchical sentiments." Or perhaps: "The Russian speeches awoke the wildest enthusiasm, being better understood than those spoken in English."

Precisely! It is always the stranger within our doors, the man who asked hospitality and received it, who now clamors for the destruction of all we hold sacred and dear. Three hundred years of toil and endurance, three hundred years of brave adventure and of splendid effort, went to the making of our land. Immigrants we all are; but the early settlers, whether they came with wealth and possessions, or with only their strong hands and honest hearts, shared the same purpose. They meant to construct a new world, stably governed, a world of order and of freedom. For this they braved hard living and countless dangers. For this their descendants fought the Revolutionary and the Civil Wars. For this we helped to smash the terrorism of Germany. Was it only that we might be smashed in turn by the bootless terrorism of Russia?

What are Bolsheviks? Men who grant civic rights to one class, and deny them to another. Men who rob treasuries, repudiate debts, and murder opponents. Men who spit at religion, and despoil marriage of all that gives it honor and security. What have they done for Russia? Reduced it to beggary and bloody chaos. What have they done for the people they swore to befriend? Given them schools without system or scholarship, factories without raw materials, shops without goods, a government without credit, and farms where no man will plant the food he is not sure of harvesting. Like the blinded Cyclops, Russia can still hurl destructive missiles, but can construct and uphold nothing?

Is this a model for the United States to follow? Is this the shining light that dazzles her? Here where men have some decent regard for the rights of their fellow men, and for the laws they live by, here where there is enough and to spare for all if our resources are husbanded, here where the ranks of labor have achieved security—here, at least, there is no room for foreign interference. Americans—Americans of all nationalities united in a common bond of citizenship—propose to run America. They have worked for her, fought for her, loved and cherished her. They will never give her up to be the spoil of Bolshevism.

Agnes Repplier